Energy Efficiency Policy with Price-quality Discrimination

dc.creatorNauleau, Marie-Laure
dc.creatorGiraudet, Louis-Gaëtan
dc.creatorQuirion, Philippe
dc.date2017-04-01T14:02:44Z
dc.date.accessioned2026-07-09T09:07:04Z
dc.descriptionWe compare a range of energy efficiency policies in a durable good market subject to both energy-use externalities and price-quality discrimination by a monopolist. We find that the social optimum can be achieved with differentiated subsidies. With ad valorem subsidies, the subsidization of the high-end good leads the monopolist to cut the quality of the low-end good. The rates should always be decreasing in energy efficiency. With per-quality subsidies, there is no such interference and the rates can be increasing if the externality is large enough relative to the market share of low-type consumers. Stand-alone instruments only achieve second-best outcomes. A minimum quality standard may be set at the high-end of the product line if consumers are not too dissimilar, otherwise it should only target the low-end good. An energy tax should be set above the marginal external cost. Likewise, a uniform ad valorem subsidy should be set above the subsidy that would be needed to specifically internalize energy-use externalities. Lastly, if, as is often observed in practice, only the high-end good is to be incentivized, a per-quality schedule should be preferred over an ad valorem one. An ad valorem tax on the high-end good may even be preferred over an ad valorem subsidy if the externality is small enough and low-end consumers dominate the market.
dc.identifierdoi:10.22004/ag.econ.202240
dc.identifierhttps://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/202240/files/NDL2015-033.pdf
dc.identifierhttp://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/202240
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/123456789/605841
dc.languageeng
dc.publisher
dc.sourcehttp://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/202240
dc.titleEnergy Efficiency Policy with Price-quality Discrimination
dc.typeText

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