VOLUNTARY POLLUTION ABATEMENT: TESTING ALTERNATIVE THEORIES
| dc.creator | Innes, Robert | |
| dc.creator | Sam, Abdoul G. | |
| dc.date | 2017-04-01T19:56:03Z | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2026-07-09T03:37:37Z | |
| dc.description | We broaden the existing empirical literature on environmental regulation and voluntary pollution abatement programs by testing the effects of implicit boycott threats and a firm's participation in a partnership program on its subsequent regulatory oversight using EPA's 33/50 program as a research experiment. Our results are consistent with the hypothesis of a preemptive self-selection to deter consumer boycotts. The findings also indicate that (1) predetermined corrective actions constitute a significant determinant of voluntary participation and (2) EPA reciprocated to voluntary participation by easing regulatory oversight on participants. | |
| dc.identifier | doi:10.22004/ag.econ.21945 | |
| dc.identifier | https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/21945/files/sp03in01.pdf | |
| dc.identifier | http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/21945 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/123456789/536870 | |
| dc.language | eng | |
| dc.publisher | ||
| dc.source | http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/21945 | |
| dc.title | VOLUNTARY POLLUTION ABATEMENT: TESTING ALTERNATIVE THEORIES | |
| dc.type | Text |