When Government Spending Serves the Elites: Consequences for Economic Growth in a Context of Market Imperfections
| dc.creator | Lopez, Ramon E. | |
| dc.creator | Islam, Asif M. | |
| dc.date | 2017-04-01T19:19:36Z | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2026-07-09T04:38:23Z | |
| dc.description | Government spending should be regarded as a social and political phenomenon, not merely as a technical choice. We argue that there is an implicit contract between the organized elites and politicians which often leads to a pro-elite allocation of public resources. A natural and simple taxonomy of government spending follows from this view: spending in public goods broadly defined which mitigate market failures versus spending in non-social subsidies, mainly a vehicle to serve the elites. We theoretically and empirically show that pro-elite spending biases are costly in terms of economic growth. The empirical findings are exceptionally robust. | |
| dc.identifier | doi:10.22004/ag.econ.45875 | |
| dc.identifier | https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/45875/files/08-13.pdf | |
| dc.identifier | http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/45875 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/123456789/552814 | |
| dc.language | eng | |
| dc.publisher | ||
| dc.source | http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/45875 | |
| dc.title | When Government Spending Serves the Elites: Consequences for Economic Growth in a Context of Market Imperfections | |
| dc.type | Text |