Asymmetric Information and Middleman Margins

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dc.creatorMitra, Sandip
dc.creatorMookherjee, Dilip
dc.creatorTorero, Maximo
dc.creatorVisaria, Sujata
dc.date2018-04-11T17:06:37Z
dc.date2018-04-11T17:06:37Z
dc.date2018-03
dc.date.accessioned2026-07-01T00:42:59Z
dc.descriptionWest Bengal potato farmers cannot directly access wholesale markets and do not knowwholesale prices. Local middlemen earn large margins; pass-through from wholesale to farmgate prices is negligible. When we informed farmers in randomly chosen villages about wholesale prices, average farmgate sales and prices were unaffected, but pass-through to farmgate prices increased. These results can be explained by a model where farmers bargain ex post with village middlemen, with the outside option of selling to middlemen outside the village. They are inconsistent with standard oligopolistic models of pass-through, search frictions, or risk-sharing contracts.
dc.formatapplication/pdf
dc.identifierReview of Economics and Statistics
dc.identifierhttps://hdl.handle.net/10986/29657
dc.identifier10.1596/29657
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/123456789/409755
dc.publisherThe MIT Press
dc.rightsCC BY-NC-ND 3.0 IGO
dc.rightshttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/igo
dc.rightsWorld Bank
dc.subjectWEST BENGAL
dc.subjectMIDDLEMEN
dc.subjectFARMGATE PRICES
dc.subjectPOTATO FARMERS
dc.titleAsymmetric Information and Middleman Margins
dc.titleAn Experiment with Indian Potato Farmers
dc.typeJournal Article
dc.typeArticle de journal
dc.typeArtículo de revista

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