Discounting and Climate Change Policy

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dc.creatorKarp, Larry S.
dc.creatorTsur, Yacov
dc.date2017-04-01T19:27:30Z
dc.date.accessioned2026-07-09T02:49:49Z
dc.descriptionA constant social discount rate cannot reflect both a reasonable opportunity cost of public funds and an ethically defensible concern for generations in the distant future. We use a model of hyperbolic discounting that achieves both goals. We imbed this discounting model in a simple climate change model to calculate “constant equivalent discount rates” and plausible levels of expenditure to control climate change. We compare these results to discounting assumptions and policy recommendations in the Stern Review on Climate Change
dc.identifierdoi:10.22004/ag.econ.7192
dc.identifierhttps://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/7192/files/wp071038.pdf
dc.identifierhttp://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/7192
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/123456789/520916
dc.languageeng
dc.publisher
dc.sourcehttp://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/7192
dc.titleDiscounting and Climate Change Policy
dc.typeText

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University of Minnesota