Intrahousehold Bargaining and Resource Allocation in Developing Countries
| dc.creator | Doss, Cheryl | |
| dc.date | 2012-06-26T15:39:29Z | |
| dc.date | 2012-06-26T15:39:29Z | |
| dc.date | 2012 | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2026-07-01T00:45:12Z | |
| dc.description | Policy makers and development practitioners intuitively expect that women's bargaining power will affect key development outcomes, such as the health and education of children and the wellbeing of the women themselves. In addition, women's bargaining power may affect decisions within the household that impact household production, such as the allocation of labor across various activities, including household chores, agricultural work, and wage work. Thus, it is critical to have measures of women's bargaining power that can be used in the evaluation of programs. Household members bargain over many different outcomes, whether the bargaining is explicit or implicit. These outcomes may include consumption and expenditure, production (such as the use of inputs), labor allocation, asset ownership, children's health and education, decision-making, and violence within the household. This paper provides details on the various outcome measures that have been used and the strengths and weaknesses of each for understanding women's bargaining power. | |
| dc.format | application/pdf | |
| dc.identifier | https://hdl.handle.net/10986/9145 | |
| dc.identifier | https://doi.org/10.1596/9145 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/123456789/410435 | |
| dc.language | English | |
| dc.publisher | Washington, DC: World Bank | |
| dc.rights | CC BY 3.0 IGO | |
| dc.rights | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ | |
| dc.rights | World Bank | |
| dc.subject | World Development Report 2012 | |
| dc.title | Intrahousehold Bargaining and Resource Allocation in Developing Countries |