Inspection Intensity and Market Structure
| dc.creator | Marette, Stephan | |
| dc.date | 2017-04-01T14:34:27Z | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2026-07-09T03:23:59Z | |
| dc.description | An investigation of financing an inspection policy while allowing the enforcement of a market regulation is described. A simple model shows that the intensity of controls depends on the market structure. Under a given number of firms, the per-firm probability of controls is lower than one, since firms' incentive to comply with regulation holds under positive profits. In this case, a lump-sum tax is used for limiting distortions coming from financing with a fixed fee. Under free entry, the per-firm probability of controls is equal to one, and only a fixed fee that prevents excess entry is used to finance inspection. | |
| dc.identifier | doi:10.22004/ag.econ.18351 | |
| dc.identifier | https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/18351/files/wp050412.pdf | |
| dc.identifier | http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/18351 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/123456789/531884 | |
| dc.language | eng | |
| dc.publisher | ||
| dc.source | http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/18351 | |
| dc.title | Inspection Intensity and Market Structure | |
| dc.type | Text |