Targeting hunger or votes? The political economy of humanitarian transfers in Malawi

dc.creatorDuchoslav, Jan
dc.creatorKenamu, Edwin
dc.creatorThunde, Jack
dc.date2022-10-06
dc.date2022-11-03T07:09:16Z
dc.date2022-11-03T07:09:16Z
dc.date.accessioned2026-06-27T15:35:05Z
dc.descriptionDo electoral considerations play a role in the targeting of humanitarian transfers? We analyze the targeting of direct cash and food transfers distributed in Malawi in response to an exceptionally poor harvest following a late and erratic rainy season of 2015-16. Combining household survey data on transfers with a remotely sensed measure of drought and with the results of the 2014 and 2019 parliamentary elections, we show that transfers were disproportionately targeted at marginal constituencies. Rather than distributing the transfers based solely on need or mobilizing its tribal base, the government attempted to persuade swing voters to support its candidates in the next elections. We found no evidence that this strategy was successful at increasing the vote of ruling party candidates in subsequent elections.
dc.formatapplication/pdf
dc.identifierhttps://hdl.handle.net/10568/125315
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/123456789/108573
dc.languageen
dc.publisherInternational Food Policy Research Institute
dc.rightsOpen Access
dc.sourceDuchoslav, Jan; Kenamu, Edwin; and Thunde, Jack. 2022. Targeting hunger or votes? The political economy of humanitarian transfers in Malawi. MaSSP Working Paper 39. Washington, DC: International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI). https://doi.org/10.2499/p15738coll2.136401. http://books.google.com/books/about?id=yNCTEAAAQBAJ
dc.sourcehttps://play.google.com/store/books/details?id=yNCTEAAAQBAJ
dc.subjecthunger
dc.subjectcash transfers
dc.subjectpolitical systems
dc.subjectdisaster relief
dc.titleTargeting hunger or votes? The political economy of humanitarian transfers in Malawi
dc.typeWorking Paper

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