Grameen Bank Lending : Does Group Liability Matter?

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dc.creatorKhandker, Shahidur R.
dc.date2013-01-02T22:35:51Z
dc.date2013-01-02T22:35:51Z
dc.date2012-09
dc.date.accessioned2026-07-01T01:01:09Z
dc.descriptionCompeting theories increasingly support the positive role of social capital in small loan default costs of group lending; at the same time, potential group collusion may increase loan delinquencies. Findings from the available literature are mixed on the role of the various attributes of group lending. But past studies suffer from estimation bias due to the unobserved sorting behavior of group members and their other attributes. This paper attempts to resolve that estimation bias by utilizing longitudinal data from 297 Grameen Bank groups since their inceptions. A dynamic lagged dependent model with correction for time-varying heterogeneity of group and individual behavior is applied to estimate the effect of group liability in the Grameen Bank. The results suggest that group liability matters in both loan disbursement and repayment, with women less of a credit risk than men and women's groups more homogeneous than men's. Finally, the benefits of social capital outweigh the costs of group collusion, especially for women's groups, thereby reducing overall default rates. The risk-pooling behavior of diverse men's groups increases men's repayment behavior. Overall, group lending as practiced by Grameen Bank appears to increase repayment rates.
dc.formatapplication/pdf
dc.formattext/plain
dc.identifierhttp://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2012/09/16753280/grameen-bank-lending-group-liability-matter
dc.identifierhttps://hdl.handle.net/10986/12058
dc.identifierhttps://doi.org/10.1596/1813-9450-6204
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/123456789/414283
dc.languageEnglish
dc.languageen_US
dc.publisherWorld Bank, Washington, DC
dc.relationPolicy Research Working Paper; No. 6204
dc.rightsCC BY 3.0 IGO
dc.rightshttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/
dc.rightsWorld Bank
dc.subjectACCESS TO CREDIT
dc.subjectADVERSE SELECTION
dc.subjectAGRICULTURE
dc.subjectAMOUNT DUE
dc.subjectAMOUNT OF LOAN
dc.subjectBANK BRANCH
dc.subjectBANK LENDING
dc.subjectBANK POLICY
dc.subjectBOND
dc.subjectBORROWER
dc.subjectBORROWING
dc.subjectBRANCHES
dc.subjectCOLLATERAL
dc.subjectCOLLUSION
dc.subjectCONSUMER CREDIT
dc.subjectCONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS
dc.subjectCREDIT AGREEMENT
dc.subjectCREDIT CONSTRAINT
dc.subjectCREDIT CONTRACTS
dc.subjectCREDIT COOPERATIVE
dc.subjectCREDIT GROUPS
dc.subjectCREDIT MARKET
dc.subjectCREDIT PROGRAMS
dc.subjectCREDIT RISK
dc.subjectCREDIT RISKS
dc.subjectDEFAULT COST
dc.subjectDEFAULT COSTS
dc.subjectDEFAULT RATES
dc.subjectDEFAULTS
dc.subjectDEMAND FOR CREDIT
dc.subjectDEPENDENT
dc.subjectDEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS
dc.subjectDEVELOPMENT POLICY
dc.subjectDISBURSEMENT
dc.subjectDISBURSEMENTS
dc.subjectDISECONOMIES OF SCALE
dc.subjectECONOMETRICS
dc.subjectECONOMIC CONDITIONS
dc.subjectECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
dc.subjectECONOMIC RESOURCES
dc.subjectEMPLOYMENT
dc.subjectENDOGENOUS VARIABLES
dc.subjectEQUATIONS
dc.subjectEXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS
dc.subjectEXTERNALITY
dc.subjectFINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
dc.subjectGROUP BORROWERS
dc.subjectGROUP CREDIT
dc.subjectGROUP LENDING
dc.subjectGROUP LENDING PROGRAMS
dc.subjectGROUP LOAN
dc.subjectGROUP REPAYMENT
dc.subjectGROUP-LENDING
dc.subjectHOUSEHOLD INCOME
dc.subjectHOUSING
dc.subjectINDEBTED
dc.subjectINDIVIDUAL DEFAULT
dc.subjectINDIVIDUAL LIABILITY
dc.subjectINDIVIDUAL LOAN
dc.subjectINFORMATION ASYMMETRIES
dc.subjectINSTITUTIONAL CREDIT
dc.subjectINSTRUMENT
dc.subjectINSURANCE
dc.subjectINTERNATIONAL BANK
dc.subjectJOINT LIABILITY
dc.subjectLAND ASSETS
dc.subjectLENDER
dc.subjectLENDERS
dc.subjectLEVERAGE
dc.subjectLIABILITY
dc.subjectLOAN AMOUNT
dc.subjectLOAN AMOUNTS
dc.subjectLOAN CONTRACTS
dc.subjectLOAN DEFAULT
dc.subjectLOAN DEFAULT RATE
dc.subjectLOAN DEFAULT RATES
dc.subjectLOAN DEFAULTS
dc.subjectLOAN PERFORMANCE
dc.subjectLOAN RECOVERIES
dc.subjectLOAN RECOVERY
dc.subjectLOAN REPAYMENT
dc.subjectLOAN REPAYMENT RATE
dc.subjectLOAN REPAYMENT RATES
dc.subjectLOAN REPAYMENTS
dc.subjectLOAN SIZE
dc.subjectLOANS TO GROUPS
dc.subjectMARKET FAILURES
dc.subjectMICROCREDIT
dc.subjectMICROCREDIT PROGRAM
dc.subjectMICROFINANCE
dc.subjectMICROFINANCE INSTITUTIONS
dc.subjectMICROFINANCE PROGRAMS
dc.subjectMORAL HAZARD
dc.subjectPEER PRESSURE
dc.subjectPENALTIES
dc.subjectPROBABILITY OF DEFAULT
dc.subjectPUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
dc.subjectRECOVERY RATE
dc.subjectRECOVERY RATES
dc.subjectREPAYMENT
dc.subjectREPAYMENT BEHAVIOR
dc.subjectREPAYMENT HISTORY
dc.subjectREPAYMENT INCENTIVES
dc.subjectREPAYMENT PERFORMANCE
dc.subjectREPAYMENT RATE
dc.subjectREPAYMENT RATES
dc.subjectRISK POOLING
dc.subjectSMALL LOAN
dc.subjectSOCIAL CAPITAL
dc.subjectSOCIAL COLLATERAL
dc.subjectTRANSACTION
dc.subjectTRANSACTION COST
dc.titleGrameen Bank Lending : Does Group Liability Matter?

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