To Serve the Community or Oneself: The Public Servant's Dilemma

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dc.creatorBarr, Abigail
dc.creatorLindelöw, Magnus
dc.creatorSerneels, Pieter
dc.date2013-06-26T15:23:30Z
dc.date2013-06-26T15:23:30Z
dc.date2004-01
dc.date.accessioned2026-07-01T01:28:11Z
dc.descriptionEmbezzlement of resources is hampering public service delivery throughout the developing world. Research on this issue is hindered by problems of measurement. To overcome these problems, the authors use an economic experiment to investigate the determinants of corrupt behavior. They focus on three aspects of behavior: 1) Embezzling by public servants. 2) Monitoring effort by designated monitors. 3) Voting by community members when provided with an opportunity to select a monitor. The experiment allows the authors to study the effect of wages, effort observance, rules for monitor assignment, and professional norms. Their experimental subjects are Ethiopian nursing students. The authors find that service providers who earn more embezzle less, although the effect is small. Embezzlement is also lower when observance (associated with the risk of being caught and sanctioned) is high, and when service providers face an elected, rather than a randomly selected monitor. Monitors put more effort into monitoring when they face reelection, and when the public servant receives a higher wage. Communities reelect monitors who put more effort into exposing embezzlement. Framing-whereby players are referred to as "health workers" and "community members" rather than by abstract labels-affects neither mean embezzlement nor mean monitoring effort, but significantly increases the variance in both. This suggests that different types of experimental subjects respond differently to the framing, possibly because they adhere to different norms.
dc.formatapplication/pdf
dc.formattext/plain
dc.identifierhttp://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2004/01/2892998/serve-community-or-oneself-public-servants-dilemma
dc.identifierhttps://hdl.handle.net/10986/14195
dc.identifierhttps://doi.org/10.1596/1813-9450-3187
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/123456789/418370
dc.languageEnglish
dc.languageen_US
dc.publisherWorld Bank, Washington, D.C.
dc.relationPolicy Research Working Paper;No.3187
dc.rightsCC BY 3.0 IGO
dc.rightshttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/
dc.rightsWorld Bank
dc.subjectEMBEZZLEMENT
dc.subjectPUBLIC SERVICE DELIVERY
dc.subjectMEASUREMENT SYSTEMS
dc.subjectECONOMIC MODELS
dc.subjectCORRUPT PRACTICES
dc.subjectPUBLIC SERVANTS
dc.subjectMONITORING CRITERIA
dc.subjectVOTING ARRANGEMENTS
dc.subjectWAGE SETTLEMENTS
dc.subjectOBSERVATION
dc.subjectPROFESSIONAL STANDARDS
dc.subjectNURSING STUDENTS
dc.subjectSANCTIONS
dc.subjectELECTIONS
dc.subjectACCOUNTABILITY
dc.subjectADOLESCENCE
dc.subjectBANDAGES
dc.subjectBRIBERY
dc.subjectCOMMUNITY MEMBERS
dc.subjectCOMMUNITY PARTICIPATION
dc.subjectCONTRACT ENFORCEMENT
dc.subjectCORRUPTION
dc.subjectCOUNTRY DATA
dc.subjectCROWDING
dc.subjectDECENTRALIZATION
dc.subjectDEMOCRACY
dc.subjectECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
dc.subjectECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES
dc.subjectECONOMIC REVIEW
dc.subjectECONOMISTS
dc.subjectEMPLOYMENT
dc.subjectEQUIPMENT
dc.subjectETHICS
dc.subjectHEALTH CARE
dc.subjectHEALTH CARE PROVIDERS
dc.subjectHEALTH CARE SYSTEMS
dc.subjectHEALTH ECONOMICS
dc.subjectHEALTH OUTCOMES
dc.subjectHEALTH PLANNING
dc.subjectHEALTH POLICY
dc.subjectHEALTH SECTOR
dc.subjectHEALTH WORKERS
dc.subjectINCOME
dc.subjectINSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT
dc.subjectLEGAL SYSTEMS
dc.subjectLOW INCOME
dc.subjectLOW INCOME COUNTRIES
dc.subjectMEDICAL CARE
dc.subjectMONITORING EFFORT
dc.subjectMOTIVATION
dc.subjectNGOS
dc.subjectNURSING
dc.subjectPATIENTS
dc.subjectPETTY CORRUPTION
dc.subjectPOLICY RESEARCH
dc.subjectPOLITICAL INSTABILITY
dc.subjectPOLITICAL RIGHTS
dc.subjectPRIVATE SECTOR
dc.subjectPROBABILITY
dc.subjectPROFESSIONS
dc.subjectPUBLIC OFFICIALS
dc.subjectPUBLIC SECTOR
dc.subjectPUBLIC SECTOR MANAGEMENT
dc.subjectPUBLIC SERVICE DELIVERY
dc.subjectRELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS
dc.subjectTRANSPARENCY
dc.subjectUNOFFICIAL ECONOMY
dc.subjectURBAN DWELLERS
dc.subjectVIOLENCE
dc.subjectWELFARE ECONOMICS
dc.subjectWORKERS
dc.titleTo Serve the Community or Oneself: The Public Servant's Dilemma

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