Getting on the Map: The Political Economy of State-Level Electricity Restructuring

dc.creatorAndo, Amy Whritenour
dc.creatorPalmer, Karen L.
dc.date2017-04-01T20:01:31Z
dc.date.accessioned2026-07-09T02:59:21Z
dc.descriptionRetail competition in electricity markets is expected to lead to more efficient electricity supply, lower electricity prices, more innovation by suppliers and a greater variety of electric power service packages. However, only a handful of states have currently gone so far as to pass legislation and/or make regulatory decisions to establish retail wheeling. This paper analyzes a variety of factors that may influence the rate at which legislators and regulators move towards establishing retail competition. In general, we find that where one interest group dominates others in the struggle for influence over the decision makers, the net effect seems to push a state forward more quickly when retail wheeling is expected to yield large efficiency gains.
dc.identifierdoi:10.22004/ag.econ.10643
dc.identifierhttps://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/10643/files/dp980019.pdf
dc.identifierhttp://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/10643
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/123456789/524315
dc.languageeng
dc.publisher
dc.sourcehttp://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/10643
dc.titleGetting on the Map: The Political Economy of State-Level Electricity Restructuring
dc.typeText

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