Cournot Competition on a Network of Markets and Firms
| dc.creator | Ilkilic, Rahmi | |
| dc.date | 2017-04-01T20:14:36Z | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2026-07-09T04:47:27Z | |
| dc.description | Suppose markets and firms are connected in a bi-partite network, where firms can only supply to the markets they are connected to. Firms compete a la Cournot and decide how much to supply to each market they have a link with. We assume that markets have linear demand functions and firms have convex quadratic cost functions. We show there exists a unique equilibrium in any given network of firms and markets. We provide a formula which expresses the quantities at an equilibrium as a function of a network centrality measure. | |
| dc.identifier | doi:10.22004/ag.econ.50679 | |
| dc.identifier | https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/50679/files/32-09.pdf | |
| dc.identifier | http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/50679 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/123456789/554907 | |
| dc.language | eng | |
| dc.publisher | ||
| dc.source | http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/50679 | |
| dc.title | Cournot Competition on a Network of Markets and Firms | |
| dc.type | Text |