TAX ASYMMETRIES AND CAPITAL STRUCTURE CHOICES IN CLOSELY HELD FIRMS

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dc.creatorInnes, Robert
dc.date2017-04-01T19:54:49Z
dc.date.accessioned2026-07-09T09:57:37Z
dc.descriptionThis paper presents a tax-based model of an entrepreneurial firm's capital structure choice problem, exposing the relevance of non-transferable tax deductions, "at risk" loss limitation, and related asymmetries in entrepreneurs' and investors' ability to exploit tax shields. While naive application of tax-based corporate capital structure theories implies all-equity financing of a closely-held enterprise, this analysis finds circumstances under which debt financing can be optimal.
dc.identifierdoi:10.22004/ag.econ.225810
dc.identifierhttps://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/225810/files/agecon-ucdavis-87-7.pdf
dc.identifierhttp://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/225810
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/123456789/614050
dc.languageeng
dc.publisher
dc.sourcehttp://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/225810
dc.titleTAX ASYMMETRIES AND CAPITAL STRUCTURE CHOICES IN CLOSELY HELD FIRMS
dc.typeText

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