Regulatory Takings and Environmental Regulation in NAFTA's Chapter 11

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dc.creatorAisbett, Emma
dc.creatorKarp, Larry S.
dc.creatorMcAusland, Carol
dc.date2017-04-01T13:50:06Z
dc.date.accessioned2026-07-09T02:49:50Z
dc.descriptionNAFTA's investment treaty has led to several expropriation compensation claims from investors hurt by new environmental regulations. Expropriation clauses in international treaties solve post-investment moral hazard problems such as hold-ups. However, these clauses can interact with National Treatment clauses in a manner that hinders investment. A police powers carve-out from the definition of expropriation can be Pareto-improving and can increase the level of foreign investment.
dc.identifierdoi:10.22004/ag.econ.7195
dc.identifierhttps://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/7195/files/wp061014.pdf
dc.identifierhttp://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/7195
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/123456789/520919
dc.languageeng
dc.publisher
dc.sourcehttp://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/7195
dc.titleRegulatory Takings and Environmental Regulation in NAFTA's Chapter 11
dc.typeText

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