Managerial Incentives, Moral Hazard, and Structural Change in Agricultural Cooperatives

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dc.creatorZeuli, Kimberly A.
dc.creatorFoltz, Jeremy D.
dc.date2017-04-01T20:10:59Z
dc.date.accessioned2026-07-09T03:27:01Z
dc.descriptionThe federated business structure exists in many sectors of the economy, but we know little about its comparative advantage. This paper explores theoretically and empirically the current dynamics of the federated cooperative system. Two hypotheses are tested: growth at the local co-op level has made the structure redundant and managerial incentives create disloyalty. We use a unique data set from a survey of local farm supply and grain marketing cooperatives in the Midwest.
dc.identifierdoi:10.22004/ag.econ.19226
dc.identifierhttps://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/19226/files/sp05ze01.pdf
dc.identifierhttp://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/19226
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/123456789/532756
dc.languageeng
dc.publisher
dc.sourcehttp://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/19226
dc.titleManagerial Incentives, Moral Hazard, and Structural Change in Agricultural Cooperatives
dc.typeText

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