Picture-based insurance: Is it sustainable? Effects on willingness to pay, adverse selection, and moral hazard

dc.creatorKramer, Berber
dc.creatorCeballos, Francisco
dc.creatorKrupoff, Matthew
dc.creatorToor, Mann S.
dc.creatorMishra, Azad
dc.creatorKarekar, Siddesh
dc.creatorRobles, Miguel
dc.date2017
dc.date2024-06-21T09:23:51Z
dc.date2024-06-21T09:23:51Z
dc.date.accessioned2026-06-27T15:18:33Z
dc.descriptionThis project note hence describes to what extent picture-based crop insurance is viable from an economic point of view, addressing the following questions: (1) Do farmers strategically reduce crop management efforts (that is, does PBI induce moral hazard) and is there evidence of tampering with pictures in order to receive pay-outs when they have PBI coverage? (2) What is farmers’ willingness to pay for PBI compared to willingness to pay for standard weather index-based insurance (WBI)? Is farmers’ demand for PBI strong enough to justify its higher costs? (3) To what extent do farmers se-lectively enroll plots that are more prone to damage? In other words, is PBI prone to adverse selection?
dc.formatapplication/pdf
dc.identifierhttps://hdl.handle.net/10568/148111
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/123456789/100700
dc.languageen
dc.publisherInternational Food Policy Research Institute
dc.relationhttps://doi.org/10.2499/p15738coll2.133534
dc.sourceKramer, Berber; Ceballos, Francisco; Krupoff, Matthew; Toor, Mann S.; Mishra, Azad; Karekar, Siddesh; and Robles, Miguel. 2017. Picture-based insurance: Is it sustainable? Effects on willingness to pay, adverse selection, and moral hazard. Project Note 2. Washington, DC: International Food Policy Research Institue (IFPRI). https://hdl.handle.net/10568/148111
dc.subjectcrops
dc.subjectlosses
dc.subjectagricultural insurance
dc.subjectsmallholders
dc.subjectassessment
dc.subjectphotography
dc.titlePicture-based insurance: Is it sustainable? Effects on willingness to pay, adverse selection, and moral hazard
dc.typeBrief

Archivos