Formulas for Failure?

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dc.creatorLaborde, David
dc.creatorMartin, Will
dc.date2015-07-16T15:27:59Z
dc.date2015-07-16T15:27:59Z
dc.date2015-06
dc.date.accessioned2026-07-01T00:52:58Z
dc.descriptionThis paper views tariff-cutting formulas as a potential solution to the free-rider problem that arises when market opening is negotiated bilaterally and extended on a most-favored-nation basis. The negotiators in the Doha Agenda chose formulas that are ideal from an economic efficiency viewpoint in that they most sharply reduce the highest and most economically-costly tariffs. When the political support that gave rise to the original tariffs is considered, however, this approach appears to generate very high political costs per unit of gain in economic efficiency. The political costs associated with the formulas appear to have led to strong pressure for many, complex exceptions, which both lowered and increased uncertainty about members’ market access gains. Where tariff cuts focus on applied rates, it seems likely that a proportional cut rule would reduce the political costs of securing agreements. However, detailed examination of the Doha proposals with their product exceptions suggests that negotiators are likely to find cuts with exceptions politically attractive but economically costly when cuts are based on bound tariffs with different degrees of binding overhang.
dc.formatapplication/pdf
dc.formattext/plain
dc.identifierhttp://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2015/06/24619553/formulas-failure-doha-tariff-formulas-too-ambitious-success
dc.identifierhttps://hdl.handle.net/10986/22176
dc.identifierhttps://doi.org/10.1596/1813-9450-7303
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/123456789/412407
dc.languageEnglish
dc.languageen_US
dc.publisherWorld Bank, Washington, DC
dc.relationPolicy Research Working Paper;No. 7303
dc.rightsCC BY 3.0 IGO
dc.rightshttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/
dc.rightsWorld Bank
dc.subjectTARIFFS
dc.subjectTRADE VOLUMES
dc.subjectMULTILATERAL TRADE
dc.subjectPOLITICAL-SUPPORT
dc.subjectTARIFF RATES
dc.subjectWORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION
dc.subjectTRADE NEGOTIATIONS
dc.subjectBILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS
dc.subjectINTEREST
dc.subjectTARIFF NEGOTIATION
dc.subjectECONOMIC WELFARE
dc.subjectAGRICULTURAL MARKET ACCESS
dc.subjectTRADE BARRIERS
dc.subjectEXCHANGE
dc.subjectOPTION
dc.subjectTARIFF CHANGES
dc.subjectEXPORTS
dc.subjectDEVELOPING COUNTRIES
dc.subjectEXPORTERS
dc.subjectPOLITICAL ECONOMY
dc.subjectDEMAND ELASTICITIES
dc.subjectAGRICULTURAL INTERESTS
dc.subjectREVENUES
dc.subjectWELFARE FUNCTION
dc.subjectTARIFF CONCESSIONS
dc.subjectECONOMIC POLICY
dc.subjectPROTECTION FOR SALE
dc.subjectMARKET ACCESS OPPORTUNITIES
dc.subjectPRICE
dc.subjectHIGH TARIFFS
dc.subjectMARKET ACCESS
dc.subjectBENEFICIARIES
dc.subjectINTERNATIONAL BANK
dc.subjectTRADE EXPANSION
dc.subjectDEVELOPING COUNTRY
dc.subjectBORDER MEASURES
dc.subjectAGRICULTURAL TRADE LIBERALIZATION
dc.subjectAGRICULTURAL TARIFF
dc.subjectLACK OF TRANSPARENCY
dc.subjectAGRICULTURAL MARKETS
dc.subjectREDUCTION IN TARIFFS
dc.subjectAVERAGE TARIFFS
dc.subjectPRODUCTS
dc.subjectTRADING
dc.subjectFREE ACCESS
dc.subjectOPTIONS
dc.subjectTARIFF REVENUES
dc.subjectDEMAND CURVES
dc.subjectCOMMERCIAL POLICY
dc.subjectMARKETS
dc.subjectTARIFF REDUCTIONS
dc.subjectWORLD PRICES
dc.subjectCUTTING
dc.subjectACCESS
dc.subjectINTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS
dc.subjectWELFARE GAINS
dc.subjectIMPORTS
dc.subjectRATE QUOTAS
dc.subjectTRADE POLICY
dc.subjectPRODUCT
dc.subjectMARKET ACCESS NEGOTIATIONS
dc.subjectMULTILATERAL REFORMS
dc.subjectVOLUME
dc.subjectPRICE CHANGE
dc.subjectEXPENDITURE
dc.subjectAPPLIED TARIFF
dc.subjectTRADE VOLUME
dc.subjectMULTILATERAL AGREEMENTS
dc.subjectGOOD
dc.subjectAGRICULTURAL TARIFFS
dc.subjectTRANSPARENCY
dc.subjectTARIFF STRUCTURE
dc.subjectVALUE
dc.subjectCONCESSIONS
dc.subjectTRADE ORGANIZATION
dc.subjectDEMAND
dc.subjectTRADE PROTECTION
dc.subjectPRICE EFFECTS
dc.subjectTRADE REFORM
dc.subjectAGRICULTURAL SECTOR
dc.subjectAGRICULTURE
dc.subjectECONOMIC EFFICIENCY
dc.subjectSALE
dc.subjectMARKET
dc.subjectTRADE LIBERALIZATION
dc.subjectAGRICULTURAL MARKET
dc.subjectCOTTON
dc.subjectMARKET ACCESS CONCESSIONS
dc.subjectAGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS
dc.subjectINTERESTS
dc.subjectTRADE
dc.subjectGOODS
dc.subjectTARIFF ESCALATION
dc.subjectGLOBAL TRADE
dc.subjectAGRICULTURAL NEGOTIATIONS
dc.subjectTARIFF STRUCTURE
dc.subjectHOUSEHOLDS
dc.subjectSHARE
dc.subjectIMPORT VOLUMES
dc.subjectINTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT
dc.subjectTARIFF
dc.subjectREVENUE
dc.subjectSINGLE TARIFF
dc.subjectEXPORT
dc.subjectWORLD TRADE
dc.subjectCOMMODITIES
dc.subjectTARIFF RATE
dc.subjectINSTRUMENT
dc.subjectAGRICULTURAL AGREEMENT
dc.subjectMULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS
dc.subjectTRADING PARTNERS
dc.subjectAGRICULTURAL TRADE
dc.subjectGUARANTEE
dc.subjectPRICES
dc.titleFormulas for Failure?
dc.titleWere the Doha Tariff Formulas Too Ambitious for Success?
dc.typeWorking Paper
dc.typeDocument de travail
dc.typeDocumento de trabajo

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