Is Wal-Mart a Monopsony? Evidence from Local Labor Markets

dc.creatorBonanno, Alessandro
dc.creatorLopez, Rigoberto A.
dc.date2017-04-01T15:06:18Z
dc.date.accessioned2026-07-09T04:49:00Z
dc.descriptionThis paper measures the degree of monopsony power exerted by Wal-Mart over retail workers using a dominant-firm model and data in the 48 contiguous U.S. states for counties where the company operates, presenting for the first time a measure of the company’s anticompetitive behavior. Empirical results show that Wal-Mart’s monopsony power over workers varies significantly across the country, being higher in non-metro and rural counties, particularly in the south. For instance, Wal-Mart’s buying power index in labor markets in rural southern and central states is estimated to be 5% or higher while the impact on northeastern states’ retail wages is negligible.
dc.identifierdoi:10.22004/ag.econ.51289
dc.identifierhttps://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/51289/files/476BonannoLopez.pdf
dc.identifierhttp://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/51289
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/123456789/555284
dc.languageeng
dc.publisher
dc.sourcehttp://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/51289
dc.titleIs Wal-Mart a Monopsony? Evidence from Local Labor Markets
dc.typeText

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