The Price of Disclosure in the Thoroughbred Yearling Market

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dc.creatorPlant, Emily J.
dc.creatorStowe, C. Jill
dc.date2017-04-01T18:22:22Z
dc.date.accessioned2026-07-09T07:06:21Z
dc.descriptionIn this article, we examine disclosure as a tool to mitigate the effects of asymmetric information in a Thoroughbred yearling market. If disclosures influence market price, information contained therein must be valuable to buyers and hence diminish asymmetric information. Using public auction data, we find that disclosures do not influence price in a segment of the auction in which an implicit quality certification is available. However, in the other segment, we find evidence that some disclosures may provide valuable information to buyers.
dc.identifierdoi:10.22004/ag.econ.149125
dc.identifierhttps://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/149125/files/jaae607.pdf
dc.identifierhttp://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/149125
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/123456789/584550
dc.languageeng
dc.publisher
dc.sourcehttp://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/149125
dc.titleThe Price of Disclosure in the Thoroughbred Yearling Market
dc.typeText

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