WELFARE IMPROVING COLLUSION IN THE JAPANESE PORK IMPORT MARKET

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dc.creatorFabiosa, Jacinto F.
dc.date2017-04-01T19:35:05Z
dc.date.accessioned2026-07-09T03:36:22Z
dc.descriptionUnderlying parameter estimates suggest that reduction in pork exporters' profit is three times higher when the Japanese GATT safeguard is invoked, providing incentive to foreign suppliers to collude to avoid exceeding the trigger. This collusion is welfare-improving since the safeguard induces more inefficiencies. Workable and efficient allocation rules are constructed with a multi-plant monopolist structure that allows trade of quota.
dc.identifierdoi:10.22004/ag.econ.21661
dc.identifierhttps://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/21661/files/sp99fa01.pdf
dc.identifierhttp://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/21661
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/123456789/536345
dc.languageeng
dc.publisher
dc.sourcehttp://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/21661
dc.titleWELFARE IMPROVING COLLUSION IN THE JAPANESE PORK IMPORT MARKET
dc.typeText

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