Making a market for Miscanthus: Can new contract designs solve the biofuel investment hold-up problem?
| dc.creator | Wu, Steven Y. | |
| dc.creator | Rosch, Stephanie D. | |
| dc.creator | Alexander, Corinne E. | |
| dc.creator | Tyner, Wallace E. | |
| dc.creator | Yoder, Joshua | |
| dc.date | 2017-04-01T16:31:54Z | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2026-07-09T05:11:56Z | |
| dc.description | We present designs for optimal contracts to solve the investment hold-up problem for perennial crops for the biofuel industry. A fixed-price contract is ex-ante efficient but renegotiation-proof for a limited range of discount parameters. A perfectly- indexed contract is both renegotiation-proof and ex-post efficient. Provided long-run land prices are stationary, the expected cost for both contracts converges to the long-run expected price of land for a risk-neutral farmer. | |
| dc.identifier | doi:10.22004/ag.econ.61743 | |
| dc.identifier | https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/61743/files/Rosch%20AAEA%202010%20poster%20v1.pdf | |
| dc.identifier | http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/61743 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/123456789/560383 | |
| dc.language | eng | |
| dc.publisher | ||
| dc.source | http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/61743 | |
| dc.title | Making a market for Miscanthus: Can new contract designs solve the biofuel investment hold-up problem? | |
| dc.type | Text |