Favoritism and allocative efficiency: a game theoretic approach
| dc.creator | Farida, Moe | |
| dc.creator | Ahmadi-Esfahani, Fredoun Z. | |
| dc.date | 2017-04-01T19:18:34Z | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2026-07-09T04:42:35Z | |
| dc.description | This paper seeks to investigate the interaction between favoritism and allocative efficiency. The issue of whether corruption distorts allocative efficiency in a bribery game under a pre-existing environment of alleged favoritism is considered. It is demonstrated that if there is no unambiguous favoritism, observed favoritism in bribery game may disrupt allocative efficiency. A bribery game under corruption and favoritism is developed. The model and some possible equilibria are discussed. A simple numerical example from Lebanon is also presented. | |
| dc.identifier | doi:10.22004/ag.econ.48156 | |
| dc.identifier | https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/48156/files/Farida.pdf | |
| dc.identifier | http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/48156 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/123456789/553806 | |
| dc.language | eng | |
| dc.publisher | ||
| dc.source | http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/48156 | |
| dc.title | Favoritism and allocative efficiency: a game theoretic approach | |
| dc.type | Text |