Exit strategies for and potential alternatives to agricultural subsidy programs

Vista sencilla de ítem
dc.creatorTakeshima, Hiroyuki
dc.creatorLee, Hak Lim
dc.date2012
dc.date2024-10-01T13:59:06Z
dc.date2024-10-01T13:59:06Z
dc.date.accessioned2026-06-27T14:59:36Z
dc.descriptionRemoving subsidies that have been applied to agricultural inputs and closing down subsidy programs, once introduced, have proved difficult to do in many countries, whether the subsidies are for irrigation1, seed2, or fertilizer.3 Long‐running subsidy programs inflate the fiscal burden that governments must manage. While it is important to assign long‐term goals to a subsidy program in their design so that the program promotes policy consistency, stability, and confidence in input markets for farmers and input traders, such long‐term goals also result in subsidy programs becoming politically entrenched. Such long‐running subsidy systems often result in fraud or diversion of subsidies to purposes for which the programs were not designed.4 From their beginning, subsidy programs should be designed with a clear and feasible exit strategy.
dc.formatapplication/pdf
dc.formatapplication/pdf
dc.identifierhttps://hdl.handle.net/10568/154038
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/123456789/91446
dc.languageen
dc.languagept
dc.publisherInternational Food Policy Research Institute
dc.rightsOpen Access
dc.sourceTakeshima, Hiroyuki; Lee, Hak Lim. 2012. Exit strategies for and potential alternatives to agricultural subsidy programs. MozSSP Policy Note 4. Washington, DC: International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI). https://hdl.handle.net/10568/154038
dc.subjectsubsidies
dc.subjectfarm inputs
dc.subjectagricultural policies
dc.subjectproductivity
dc.titleExit strategies for and potential alternatives to agricultural subsidy programs
dc.typeBrief

Archivos

Colecciones

Instituto Internacional de Investigación sobre Políticas Alimentarias (IFPRI)