Tenancy and Soil Conservation in Market Equilibrium
| dc.creator | Lichtenberg, Erik | |
| dc.date | 2017-04-01T13:51:04Z | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2026-07-09T03:31:42Z | |
| dc.description | A theoretical analysis of equilibrium contracts between risk neutral landlords and tenants when tenants' soil exploitation is non-contractible indicates that landlords will overinvest in conservation structures. An empirical model using farm-level data provides evidence that investment in contractible soil conservation measures is greater on rental land. | |
| dc.identifier | doi:10.22004/ag.econ.20489 | |
| dc.identifier | https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/20489/files/sp01li04.pdf | |
| dc.identifier | http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/20489 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/123456789/534278 | |
| dc.language | eng | |
| dc.publisher | ||
| dc.source | http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/20489 | |
| dc.title | Tenancy and Soil Conservation in Market Equilibrium | |
| dc.type | Text |