Principal-Agent Relationships in Agricultural Cooperatives: An Empirical Analysis from Rural Alberta
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Cooperatives throughout North America are consolidating at an increasing rate and
for a variety of reasons. While many cooperatives merge with others or are acquired to
achieve greater economies of scale, several fail due to changes in the external economy,
which make them redundant. Often, such redundancy is reflected in a heightened
sense of member dissatisfaction. Many argue that such dissatisfaction is likely to arise
in cooperatives as a result of principal-agent problems. In order to determine whether
or not cooperative managers maintain the same goals as their owners, this study uses
data from a member-survey to compare Alberta cooperative members' objectives with
those they believe to be held by their cooperatives' managers. An econometric model of
the difference between members' expectations and perceptions shows how various socioeconomic
variables affect the extent to which these objectives are aligned. The results
of this analysis can help cooperative boards design managerial incentive programs
to better align their goals with those of the cooperative membership.