High-Powered Incentives and Communication Failure

Vista sencilla de ítem
dc.creatorMishra, Ajit
dc.creatorSarangi, Sudipta
dc.date2015-07-17T20:55:45Z
dc.date2015-07-17T20:55:45Z
dc.date2015-06
dc.date.accessioned2026-07-01T00:53:44Z
dc.descriptionThis paper uses a donor-provider-agent framework to study the role of provider incentives for the delivery of developmental goods like aid, credit, or technology transfer to the poor. The paper considers a situation where credible communication by the provider is the key to successful delivery. The study shows that the use of high-powered incentives can lead to breakdown of communication between providers and agents, leading to undesirable outcomes. The paper studies the interplay between incentives and communication in the presence of typical and motivated providers and finds that in certain situations incentivization leads to worse outcomes.
dc.formatapplication/pdf
dc.formattext/plain
dc.identifierhttp://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2015/06/24728266/high-powered-incentives-communication-failure
dc.identifierhttps://hdl.handle.net/10986/22225
dc.identifierhttps://doi.org/10.1596/1813-9450-7345
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/123456789/412596
dc.languageEnglish
dc.languageen_US
dc.publisherWorld Bank, Washington, DC
dc.relationPolicy Research Working Paper;No. 7345
dc.rightsCC BY 3.0 IGO
dc.rightshttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/
dc.rightsWorld Bank
dc.subjectTRADITIONAL TECHNOLOGY
dc.subjectTECHNOLOGY
dc.subjectKNOWING
dc.subjectRISK NEUTRAL
dc.subjectMOTIVATION
dc.subjectPRODUCTION
dc.subjectWAGES
dc.subjectBASIC
dc.subjectPARTICIPATION
dc.subjectINCOME
dc.subjectKNOW-HOW
dc.subjectVALUE
dc.subjectGOVERNMENT
dc.subjectCREDIT
dc.subjectPROGRAMS
dc.subjectINFORMATION
dc.subjectTEXT
dc.subjectSERVICES
dc.subjectAGRICULTURE
dc.titleHigh-Powered Incentives and Communication Failure
dc.typeWorking Paper
dc.typeDocument de travail
dc.typeDocumento de trabajo

Archivos

Colecciones

AgroKnow