The Pace of Technology Transfer in Anticipation of Joint Venture Breakup
| dc.creator | Van Long, Ngo | |
| dc.creator | Soubeyran, Antoine | |
| dc.creator | Soubeyran, Raphael | |
| dc.date | 2017-04-01T18:25:04Z | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2026-07-09T04:58:37Z | |
| dc.description | This paper studies the properties of joint-venture relationship between a technologically advanced multinational firm and a local firm operating in a developing economy where the ability to enforce contracts is weak. We formulate a dynamic model of principal-agent relationship in which at any point of time the local firm can quit without legal penalties. An early breakup may be prevented if the multinational designs a suitable scheme in which both the pace and aggregate amount of technology transfer deviate from the first-best, and a suitable flow of side payments to encourage the local firm to stay longer. | |
| dc.identifier | doi:10.22004/ag.econ.55329 | |
| dc.identifier | https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/55329/files/102-09.pdf | |
| dc.identifier | http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/55329 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/123456789/557379 | |
| dc.language | eng | |
| dc.publisher | ||
| dc.source | http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/55329 | |
| dc.title | The Pace of Technology Transfer in Anticipation of Joint Venture Breakup | |
| dc.type | Text |