The “Discouraged Worker Effect” in public works programs: Evidence from the MGNREGA in India

Vista sencilla de ítem
dc.creatorNarayanan, Sudha
dc.creatorDas, Upasak
dc.creatorLiu, Yanyan
dc.creatorBarrett, Christopher B.
dc.date2017
dc.date2024-06-21T09:24:31Z
dc.date2024-06-21T09:24:31Z
dc.date.accessioned2026-06-27T15:29:32Z
dc.descriptionThis study investigates the consequences of poor implementation in public workfare programs, focusing on the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA) in India. Using nationally representative data, we test empirically for a discouraged worker effect arising from either of two mechanisms: administrative rationing of jobs among those who seek work and delays in wage payments. We find strong evidence at the household and district levels that administrative rationing discourages subsequent demand for work. Delayed wage payments seem to matter significantly during rainfall shocks. We find further that rationing is strongly associated with indicators of implementation ability such as staff capacity. Politics appears to play only a limited role. The findings suggest that assessments of the relevance of public programs over their lifecycle need to factor in implementation quality.
dc.formatapplication/pdf
dc.identifierhttps://hdl.handle.net/10568/148375
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/123456789/106022
dc.languageen
dc.publisherInternational Food Policy Research Institute
dc.relationhttps://hdl.handle.net/10568/146169
dc.relationhttps://hdl.handle.net/10568/147676
dc.relationhttps://hdl.handle.net/10568/153599
dc.rightsOpen Access
dc.sourceNarayanan, Sudha; Das, Upasak; Liu, Yanyan; and Barrett, Christopher B. 2017. The “Discouraged Worker Effect” in public works programs: Evidence from the MGNREGA in India. IFPRI Discussion Paper 1633. Washington, DC: International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI). https://hdl.handle.net/10568/148375
dc.subjectsocial protection
dc.subjectadministrative proceedings
dc.subjectlabour
dc.subjectremuneration
dc.subjectsocial safety nets
dc.titleThe “Discouraged Worker Effect” in public works programs: Evidence from the MGNREGA in India
dc.typeWorking Paper

Archivos

Colecciones

Instituto Internacional de Investigación sobre Políticas Alimentarias (IFPRI)