A Cost Function Analysis of Crop Insurance Moral Hazard and Agricultural Chemical Use

dc.creatorLiang, Yan
dc.creatorCoble, Keith H.
dc.date2017-04-01T19:27:33Z
dc.date.accessioned2026-07-09T04:45:17Z
dc.descriptionThis paper employs a cost function analysis method to investigate the existence of moral hazard in cotton buy-up insurance. The trans-log cost function estimates of the own-price elasticity of fertilizer, herbicide, and insecticide is -0.222, -0.143, and -0.121, respectively for Mississippi cotton production. Our results found statistically significant relationship between per acre direct cost and cotton buy-up insurance for year 2001 and 2005 in Mississippi. Our results also indicate that moral hazard can either decrease or increase agricultural input usage depending specific production condition in an individual year. But in general the results support effects smaller than anecdotal evidence would suggest.
dc.identifierdoi:10.22004/ag.econ.49485
dc.identifierhttps://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/49485/files/2009%20AAEA%20Selected%20Paper%20612708_YAL_KHC.pdf
dc.identifierhttp://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/49485
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/123456789/554449
dc.languageeng
dc.publisher
dc.sourcehttp://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/49485
dc.titleA Cost Function Analysis of Crop Insurance Moral Hazard and Agricultural Chemical Use
dc.typeText

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