Rent Seeking and Power Hierarchies: A Noncooperative Model of Network Formation with Antagonistic Links
| dc.creator | Huremovic, Kenan | |
| dc.date | 2017-04-01T14:05:44Z | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2026-07-09T08:07:40Z | |
| dc.description | Network structure has a significant role in determining the outcomes of many socioeconomic relationships, including the antagonistic ones. In this paper we study a situation in which agents, embedded in a network, simultaneously play interrelated bilateral contest games with their neighbors. Interrelatedness of contests induces complex local and global network effects. We first characterize the equilibrium of a game on an arbitrary fixed network. Then we study a dynamic network formation model, introducing a novel but intuitive link formation protocol. As links represent antagonistic relationships, link formation is unilateral while link destruction is bilateral. A complete k-partite network is the unique stable network topology. As a result, the model provides a micro-foundation for the structural balance concept in social psychology, and the main results go in line with theoretical and empirical findings from other disciplines, including international relations, sociology and biology. | |
| dc.identifier | doi:10.22004/ag.econ.172701 | |
| dc.identifier | https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/172701/files/NDL2014-045.pdf | |
| dc.identifier | http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/172701 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/123456789/595827 | |
| dc.language | eng | |
| dc.publisher | ||
| dc.source | http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/172701 | |
| dc.title | Rent Seeking and Power Hierarchies: A Noncooperative Model of Network Formation with Antagonistic Links | |
| dc.type | Text |