How to Make Institutional Economics Policy-Relevant: Theoretical Considerations and an Application to Rural Credit Markets in Developing Countries

dc.creatorPetrick, Martin
dc.date2017-04-01T20:15:32Z
dc.date.accessioned2026-07-09T03:52:02Z
dc.descriptionWelfare economics as the traditional, prescriptive theory framework used in agricultural economics has been criticised by institutional economists as being largely irrelevant to real-world policy issues. We therefore ask how normative statements are possible within an economic theory framework that does recognise the importance of institutional arrangements. Instead of applying established outcome-oriented criteria of social welfare, we examine whether the rules of economic interaction allow the acquisition of gains from cooperation. We suggest to reconstruct any interaction as an existing or repealed social dilemma. This approach helps to identify common rule interests which create room for improvement of all parties involved, and to suggest desirable institutional reforms. An application to credit markets in developing countries demonstrates the insufficiency of welfare economic arguments and the potential insights generated by a social dilemma heuristic. The latter sheds new light on the role of various forms of collateral and informal arrangements to overcome credit rationing.
dc.identifierdoi:10.22004/ag.econ.25702
dc.identifierhttps://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/25702/files/cp060333.pdf
dc.identifierhttp://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/25702
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/123456789/541116
dc.languageeng
dc.publisher
dc.sourcehttp://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/25702
dc.titleHow to Make Institutional Economics Policy-Relevant: Theoretical Considerations and an Application to Rural Credit Markets in Developing Countries
dc.typeText

Archivos