Size Monotonicity and Stability of the Core in Hedonic Games
| dc.creator | Dimitrov, Dinko | |
| dc.creator | Chin Sung, Shao | |
| dc.date | 2017-04-01T13:56:28Z | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2026-07-09T05:46:45Z | |
| dc.description | We show that the core of each strongly size monotonic hedonic game is not empty and is externally stable. This is in sharp contrast to other sufficient conditions for core non-emptiness which do not even guarantee the existence of a stable set in such games. | |
| dc.identifier | doi:10.22004/ag.econ.115722 | |
| dc.identifier | https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/115722/files/NDL2011-052.pdf | |
| dc.identifier | http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/115722 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/123456789/568213 | |
| dc.language | eng | |
| dc.publisher | ||
| dc.source | http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/115722 | |
| dc.title | Size Monotonicity and Stability of the Core in Hedonic Games | |
| dc.type | Text |