Computational Complexity in Additive Hedonic Games
| dc.creator | Sung, Shao Chin | |
| dc.creator | Dimitrov, Dinko | |
| dc.date | 2017-04-01T20:12:21Z | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2026-07-09T04:39:42Z | |
| dc.description | We investigate the computational complexity of several decision problems in hedonic coalition formation games and demonstrate that attaining stability in such games remains NP-hard even when they are additive. Precisely, we prove that when either core stability or strict core stability is under consideration, the existence problem of a stable coalition structure is NP-hard in the strong sense. Furthermore, the corresponding decision problems with respect to the existence of a Nash stable coalition structure and of an individually stable coalition structure turn out to be NP-complete in the strong sense. | |
| dc.identifier | doi:10.22004/ag.econ.46655 | |
| dc.identifier | https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/46655/files/98-08.pdf | |
| dc.identifier | http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/46655 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/123456789/553135 | |
| dc.language | eng | |
| dc.publisher | ||
| dc.source | http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/46655 | |
| dc.title | Computational Complexity in Additive Hedonic Games | |
| dc.type | Text |