Dynamic implications of patenting for crop genetic resources

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dc.creatorKoo, Bonwoo
dc.creatorWright, Brian D.
dc.date1999
dc.date2024-11-21T09:54:43Z
dc.date2024-11-21T09:54:43Z
dc.date.accessioned2026-06-27T15:22:10Z
dc.descriptionIn a climate of rapid technological change, it is important to evaluate policies on the innovation incentives that result from the introduction of intellectual property rights as they relate to agricultural genetic resources. In this paper, we use a stylized model of cumulative innovation to explore the dynamics of introducing patent protection with licensing agreements, and then we contrast those results with the comparative-statics viewpoint. We also investigate the dynamic effects of claims on behalf of farmers on the profits of private crop breeders whose output is newly protected by patents. We show that the choices about patent life and licensing share that optimize worldwide dynamic social welfare can be quite different from the values that maximize steady-state social welfare. Further, recognition of farmers’ rights entails a dynamic welfare loss to producers and consumers that is not revealed in a comparative-statics analysis.
dc.formatapplication/pdf
dc.identifierhttps://hdl.handle.net/10568/161295
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/123456789/102338
dc.languageen
dc.publisherInternational Food Policy Research Institute
dc.rightsOpen Access
dc.sourceKoo, Bonwoo; Wright, Brian D. 1999. Dynamic implications of patenting for crop genetic resources. EPTD Discussion Paper 51. https://hdl.handle.net/10568/161295
dc.subjectplant breeding
dc.subjectinnovation
dc.subjectgenetic engineering
dc.subjecteconomic aspects
dc.subjectintellectual property rights
dc.titleDynamic implications of patenting for crop genetic resources
dc.typeWorking Paper

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Instituto Internacional de Investigación sobre Políticas Alimentarias (IFPRI)