Neopatrimonialism and agricultural protection: The case of maize in Malawi

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dc.creatorPhiri, Horace
dc.creatorEdriss, Abdi Khalil
dc.date2013
dc.date2024-10-01T13:57:00Z
dc.date2024-10-01T13:57:00Z
dc.date.accessioned2026-06-27T15:38:05Z
dc.descriptionThis empirical study uses data from 1970 to 2010 to estimate levels of neopatrimonialism in Malawi. We then test how neopatrimonialism has affected policy-induced agriculture producer incentives. Three dimensions are used to measure neopatrimonialism – systematic clientelism, a power concentration index, and control of corruption. All were negatively related to the level of producer support provided farmers by government. This suggests that the manifestation of a patronage system creates policy-induced disincentives to agricultural production due to worsening corruption, concentration of political power, and a crowding out of development expenditure by the costs of maintaining a bloated civil service. This result reaffirms the belief that neopatrimonialism results in poor performance of the agricultural sector of countries in sub-Saharan Africa
dc.formatapplication/pdf
dc.identifierhttps://hdl.handle.net/10568/153644
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/123456789/110098
dc.languageen
dc.publisherInternational Food Policy Research Institute
dc.rightsOpen Access
dc.sourcePhiri, Horace and Edris, Abdi Khalil. 2013. Neopatrimonialism and agricultural protection: The case of maize in Malawi. MaSSP Working Paper 1. Washington, DC: International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI). https://hdl.handle.net/10568/153644
dc.subjectproductivity
dc.subjectagricultural policies
dc.subjectincentives
dc.subjectmaize
dc.subjectcorruption
dc.subjectproducer prices
dc.titleNeopatrimonialism and agricultural protection: The case of maize in Malawi
dc.typeBrief

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