On the Efficacy of Contractual Provisions for Processing Tomatoes
| dc.creator | Hueth, Brent | |
| dc.creator | Ligon, Ethan | |
| dc.date | 2017-04-01T19:30:31Z | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2026-07-09T03:37:51Z | |
| dc.description | This paper uses extensive data on production outcomes for processing tomato growers in California to examine the efficacy of explicit incentives observed in grower-processor contracts. Our data include all deliveries of tomatoes to some 51 processors over a period of 7 years in which at least 65 unique types of contracts are employed. Results indicate that incentives account for a significant proportion of observed variation in production outcomes, and that complementarities across different sorts of "incentive instruments" play a prominent role in contract design. Although explicit incentives explain a substantial portion of the variation in production outcomes relative to that which could be explained by incentives (as captured by processor/year fixed effects), there remains considerable variation which might be accounted for by unobserved or implicit incentives. Finally, we control for a quite exhaustive set of factors other than incentive provisions that might conceivably affect expected production outcomes, yet are still left with a substantial amount of unexplained variation. | |
| dc.identifier | doi:10.22004/ag.econ.21990 | |
| dc.identifier | https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/21990/files/sp03hu13.pdf | |
| dc.identifier | http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/21990 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/123456789/536956 | |
| dc.language | eng | |
| dc.publisher | ||
| dc.source | http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/21990 | |
| dc.title | On the Efficacy of Contractual Provisions for Processing Tomatoes | |
| dc.type | Text |