Land Rental in Ethiopia: Marshallian Inefficiency or Factor Market Imperfections and Tenure Insecurity as Binding Constraints?

Vista sencilla de ítem
dc.creatorDeininger, Klaus W.
dc.creatorAli, Daniel Ayalew
dc.creatorAlemu, Tekie
dc.date2017-04-01T19:17:37Z
dc.date.accessioned2026-07-09T02:57:08Z
dc.descriptionAlthough a large theoretical literature discusses the possible inefficiency of sharecropping contracts, empirical evidence on this phenomenon has been ambiguous at best. Household level fixed-effect estimates from about 8,500 plots operated by households who own and sharecrop land in the Ethiopian highlands provide support for the hypothesis of Marshallian inefficiency. At the same time, a factor adjustment model suggests that the extent to which rental markets allow households to attain their desired operational holding size is extremely limited. Our analysis points towards factor market imperfections (no rental for oxen), lack of alternative employment opportunities, and tenure insecurity as possible reasons underlying such behavior, suggesting that, rather than worrying almost exclusively about Marshallian inefficiency, it is equally warranted to give due attention to the policy framework within which land rental markets operate.
dc.identifierdoi:10.22004/ag.econ.9860
dc.identifierhttps://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/9860/files/sp07de01.pdf
dc.identifierhttp://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/9860
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/123456789/523536
dc.languageeng
dc.publisher
dc.sourcehttp://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/9860
dc.titleLand Rental in Ethiopia: Marshallian Inefficiency or Factor Market Imperfections and Tenure Insecurity as Binding Constraints?
dc.typeText

Archivos

Colecciones

University of Minnesota