Regional Fishery Management Organization as Games in Coalitional Form
| dc.creator | Do, Kim Hang Pham | |
| dc.creator | Folmer, Henk | |
| dc.date | 2017-04-01T19:57:29Z | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2026-07-09T05:27:16Z | |
| dc.description | This paper examines how a Regional Fisheries Management Organization (RFMO) might successfully achieve effective control of a high seas fishery in the context of partial cooperation. We analyse the feasible allocations of property rights among members of a given RFMO and coalitions of potential entrants. We demonstrate that the modified Shapley value is an appropriate device for the division of the gains from both partial and full cooperations. | |
| dc.identifier | doi:10.22004/ag.econ.97792 | |
| dc.identifier | https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/97792/files/2004-21-regional%20fishery%20management%20organization.pdf | |
| dc.identifier | http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/97792 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/123456789/563892 | |
| dc.language | eng | |
| dc.publisher | ||
| dc.source | http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/97792 | |
| dc.title | Regional Fishery Management Organization as Games in Coalitional Form | |
| dc.type | Text |