How does the revelation of previous bid affect new bid?
| dc.creator | Li, Yingzi | |
| dc.creator | Gallardo, R. Karina | |
| dc.creator | McCracken, Vicki A. | |
| dc.creator | Yue, Chengyan | |
| dc.creator | Luby, James | |
| dc.creator | McFerson, James R. | |
| dc.date | 2017-04-01T19:55:22Z | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2026-07-09T08:02:22Z | |
| dc.description | This study investigates the effect of the revelation of posted bids in second-price experimental auctions for apple quality attributes under the experimental design where information is added progressively across rounds. We find that the revelation of posted bids does not bias the following bids and that increased information about the apple increases the accuracy of participants’ following bids. Therefore, the final round bids are used to evaluate consumers’ willingness to pay for the apple attributes of interest in this study. Consumers are found to prefer large, firm, sweet, crisp and less defects coverage apples. | |
| dc.identifier | doi:10.22004/ag.econ.170439 | |
| dc.identifier | https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/170439/files/2014AAEAFinalSubmission%20_1_.pdf | |
| dc.identifier | http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/170439 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/123456789/594906 | |
| dc.language | eng | |
| dc.publisher | ||
| dc.source | http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/170439 | |
| dc.title | How does the revelation of previous bid affect new bid? | |
| dc.type | Text |