Cooperation and the management of local common resources in remote rural communities

dc.creatorWard, Patrick S.
dc.creatorAlvi, Muzna
dc.creatorMakhija, Simrin
dc.creatorSpielman, David J.
dc.date2026
dc.date2025-10-17T19:50:07Z
dc.date2025-10-17T19:50:07Z
dc.date.accessioned2026-06-27T14:59:58Z
dc.descriptionIt is widely recognized that local management of common pool resources can be more efficient and more effective than private markets or top-down government management, especially in remote rural communities in which the institutions may be weak or prone to elite capture. In this paper, we explore the propensity for cooperation in the management of local common resources by introducing a variant of a public goods game among remote rural communities in the state of Odisha, in eastern India. We explore various patterns of cooperation, including free riding behaviour, unconditional cooperation and conditional cooperation, in which individuals’ propensity toward cooperation is tied to their beliefs about the level of cooperation among their peers. We find that a significant portion of our sample fall into this latter category, but also that their expectations about the level of contributions among their peers are somewhat malleable. JEL classification: Q32, Q12, C72
dc.identifierhttps://hdl.handle.net/10568/177207
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/123456789/91638
dc.languageen
dc.publisherCambridge University Press
dc.rightsOpen Access
dc.sourceWard, Patrick S.; Alvi, Muzna; Makhija, Simrin; and Spielman, David J. Cooperation and the management of local common resources in remote rural communities. Environment and Development Economics. Article in press. First published online October 9, 2025. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1355770X25100181
dc.subjectcooperation
dc.subjectmanagement
dc.subjectresources
dc.subjectrural areas
dc.titleCooperation and the management of local common resources in remote rural communities
dc.typeJournal Article

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