Making Conditional Cash Transfer Programs More Efficient : Designing for Maximum Effect of the Conditionality

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dc.creatorde Janvry, Alain
dc.creatorSadoulet, Elisabeth
dc.date2014-01-02T22:55:33Z
dc.date2014-01-02T22:55:33Z
dc.date2006-02-01
dc.date.accessioned2026-07-01T01:22:05Z
dc.descriptionConditional cash transfer programs are now used extensively to encourage poor parents to increase investments in their children's human capital. These programs can be large and expensive, motivating a quest for greater efficiency through increased impact of the programs' imposed conditions on human capital formation. This requires designing the programs' targeting and calibration rules specifically to achieve this result. Using data from the Progresa randomized experiment in Mexico, this article shows that large efficiency gains can be achieved by taking into account how much the probability of a child's enrollment is affected by a conditional transfer. Rules for targeting and calibration can be made easy to implement by selecting indicators that are simple, observable, and verifiable and that cannot be manipulated by beneficiaries. The Mexico case shows that these efficiency gains can be achieved without increasing inequality among poor households.
dc.formatapplication/pdf
dc.formattext/plain
dc.identifierhttp://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2006/01/17753198/making-conditional-cash-transfer-programs-more-efficient-designing-maximum-effect-conditionality
dc.identifierWorld Bank Economic Review
dc.identifierdoi:10.1093/wber/lhj002
dc.identifierhttps://hdl.handle.net/10986/16466
dc.identifierhttps://doi.org/10.1596/16466
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/123456789/417448
dc.languageEnglish
dc.languageen_US
dc.publisherPublished by Oxford University Press on behalf of the World Bank
dc.relationWorld Bank Economic Review
dc.rightsCC BY-NC-ND 3.0 IGO
dc.rightshttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/igo
dc.rightsWorld Bank
dc.subjectACCOUNT
dc.subjectADULTS
dc.subjectAGRICULTURAL WORKERS
dc.subjectBIRTH ORDER
dc.subjectBUDGET FOR EDUCATION
dc.subjectCASH TRANSFER PROGRAMS
dc.subjectCASH TRANSFERS
dc.subjectCHILD HEALTH
dc.subjectCHILD LABOR
dc.subjectDISTRIBUTION OF CHILDREN
dc.subjectEDUCATION BUDGET
dc.subjectENROLLMENT
dc.subjectENROLLMENT RATE
dc.subjectENROLLMENT RATES
dc.subjectFAMILY MEMBERS
dc.subjectFOOD CONSUMPTION
dc.subjectFOOD POLICY
dc.subjectFOOD-FOR-EDUCATION
dc.subjectGENDER DIFFERENCES
dc.subjectGIRLS
dc.subjectHIGHER GRADES
dc.subjectHIGHER INEQUALITY
dc.subjectHUMAN CAPITAL
dc.subjectHUMAN CAPITAL FORMATION
dc.subjectHUMAN CAPITAL INVESTMENT
dc.subjectILLITERACY
dc.subjectILLITERATE PARENTS
dc.subjectINCOME
dc.subjectINEQUALITY
dc.subjectLITERACY
dc.subjectLITERATE PARENTS
dc.subjectNUTRITION
dc.subjectNUTRITIONAL SUPPLEMENTS
dc.subjectPER CAPITA CONSUMPTION
dc.subjectPOOR
dc.subjectPOOR CHILDREN
dc.subjectPOOR COUNTRIES
dc.subjectPOOR FAMILIES
dc.subjectPOOR HOUSEHOLDS
dc.subjectPOOR PARENTS
dc.subjectPOOR RURAL CHILDREN
dc.subjectPOVERTY REDUCTION
dc.subjectPRIMARY SCHOOL
dc.subjectPRIMARY SCHOOL CHILDREN
dc.subjectPRIMARY SCHOOL STUDENTS
dc.subjectPROGRAM DESIGNS
dc.subjectRE-ENTRY
dc.subjectRETURN TO EDUCATION
dc.subjectRURAL
dc.subjectRURAL AREAS
dc.subjectRURAL CHILDREN
dc.subjectRURAL COMMUNITIES
dc.subjectRURAL SCHOOLS
dc.subjectSCHOOL ATTENDANCE
dc.subjectSCHOOL ENROLLMENT
dc.subjectSCHOOL PARTICIPATION
dc.subjectSCHOOL SYSTEM
dc.subjectSCHOOL YEAR
dc.subjectSCHOOL YEARS
dc.subjectSCHOOLING
dc.subjectSCHOOLS
dc.subjectSECONDARY EDUCATION
dc.subjectSECONDARY SCHOOL
dc.subjectSOCIAL ASSISTANCE
dc.subjectSOCIAL DEVELOPMENT
dc.subjectSOCIAL SERVICES
dc.subjectTARGETED TRANSFERS
dc.subjectTARGETING
dc.subjectTRANSFER AMOUNTS
dc.titleMaking Conditional Cash Transfer Programs More Efficient : Designing for Maximum Effect of the Conditionality
dc.typeJournal
dc.typeJournal
dc.typeRevista

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