OPTIMAL COMPENSATION FOR ENDANGERED SPECIES PROTECTION UNDER ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION

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dc.creatorHuennemeyer, Anne-Juliane
dc.creatorMcKitrick, Ross
dc.creatorRollins, Kimberly S.
dc.date2017-04-01T14:16:07Z
dc.date.accessioned2026-07-09T03:36:35Z
dc.descriptionThis paper argues that policies based on economic instruments are preferable to command and control approaches for effectively protecting biological diversity. This is due to sources of inefficiencies because of informational asymmetries between the regulator and private land users. We propose a principal agent framework to design optimally structured and performance based economic incentives for private land owners.
dc.identifierdoi:10.22004/ag.econ.21693
dc.identifierhttps://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/21693/files/sp99hu03.pdf
dc.identifierhttp://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/21693
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/123456789/536422
dc.languageeng
dc.publisher
dc.sourcehttp://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/21693
dc.titleOPTIMAL COMPENSATION FOR ENDANGERED SPECIES PROTECTION UNDER ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION
dc.typeText

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