From inefficient behind-the-border policies to inefficient trade agreements: A two-tier asymmetric information model

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dc.creatorBouët, Antoine
dc.creatorLaborde Debucquet, David
dc.creatorMartimort, David
dc.date2021-05-01
dc.date2024-05-22T12:10:35Z
dc.date2024-05-22T12:10:35Z
dc.date.accessioned2026-06-27T14:58:40Z
dc.descriptionWe consider a general equilibrium model of international trade with two layers of informational asymmetries. Private information of Home producers on costs affects the design of ‘behind-the-border’ policies reflecting the political influence of inefficient producers. Home's supply is contracted, causing trade, and motivating the use of tariffs. Eliminating those instruments by means of a trade agreement may become impossible once Home has also private information on its redistributive concerns. Home, when subject to strong influence by inefficient producers, might be reluctant to adopt free trade, which may lead to limited tariff cuts and give a role for export subsidies.
dc.identifierhttps://hdl.handle.net/10568/142494
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/123456789/91013
dc.languageen
dc.publisherRoyal Economic Society
dc.relationhttps://hdl.handle.net/10568/150501
dc.rightsLimited Access
dc.sourceBouët, Antoine; Laborde Debucquet, David; and Martimort, David. 2021. From inefficient behind-the-border policies to inefficient trade agreements: A two-tier asymmetric information model. Economic Journal 131(636): 1555–1592. https://doi.org/10.1093/ej/ueaa085
dc.subjectmodels
dc.subjectpolicies
dc.subjectasymmetric information model
dc.subjecttrade
dc.subjectexport subsidies
dc.subjectexport policies
dc.subjectinternational trade
dc.titleFrom inefficient behind-the-border policies to inefficient trade agreements: A two-tier asymmetric information model
dc.typeJournal Article

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Instituto Internacional de Investigación sobre Políticas Alimentarias (IFPRI)