The Welfare Effects of Imperfect Harmonization of Trade and Industrial Policy
| dc.creator | Gatsios, Konstantine | |
| dc.creator | Karp, Larry S. | |
| dc.date | 2017-04-01T19:49:11Z | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2026-07-09T04:48:56Z | |
| dc.description | Partial cooperation in setting trade policy may be worse than no cooperation for countries who form a customs union. The paper investigates three situations where this is likely to occur. First, if the countries forming the union comprise too small a percentage of the non-competitive sector of the industry, their cooperation may be disadvantageous for essentially the same reason that a merger may be disadvantageous in oligopolistic industries. Second, even if the countries forming the union comprise the entire non-competitive sector of industry, cooperation on trade policy may be disadvantageous if industrial policy (e.g. investment subsidies) are chosen non-cooperatively. The reason is that cooperation in trade policy may exacerbate the inefficiencies created by non-cooperation at an earlier stage. Third, cooperation in choosing trade policies may encourage excessive investment by competitive importers and thus reduce the demand faced by the oligopolists. | |
| dc.identifier | doi:10.22004/ag.econ.51256 | |
| dc.identifier | https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/51256/files/89-5.pdf | |
| dc.identifier | http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/51256 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/123456789/555261 | |
| dc.language | eng | |
| dc.publisher | ||
| dc.source | http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/51256 | |
| dc.title | The Welfare Effects of Imperfect Harmonization of Trade and Industrial Policy | |
| dc.type | Text |