Public Expenditures and Environmental Protection : When Is the Cost of Funds Irrelevant?

Vista sencilla de ítem
dc.creatorEskeland, Gunnar S.
dc.date2014-08-26T21:40:56Z
dc.date2014-08-26T21:40:56Z
dc.date2000-12
dc.date.accessioned2026-07-01T01:31:14Z
dc.descriptionAssume that a public program -- whether in the form of public expenditures or regulation of private activities -- provides not only a public good to consumers but also a collective input (say, a less polluted water source for brewers, or better roads for their trucks). In a context of optimal taxation and constant returns to scale, the author shows that only the direct benefits to consumers in the form of a public good are adjusted by the shadow price of public revenue (typically downward, as Pigou conjectured) before benefits are aggregated to establish optimal provision. When public programs benefit productive sectors through cost savings, the marginal cost of provision is in optimum equal to the marginal cost savings in the benefiting sectors. The reason that programs that benefit production are not scaled down by the shadow price of public revenue is that the benefits are derived from markets that are otherwise taxable. Government can capture those cost savings at no distortionary cost by increasing the tax rates for each good, to match the cost savings provided. In practice, do public programs to protect the environment benefit mostly consumers or mostly producers? The author suggests that environmental protection has direct value for consumers and indirect value, as inputs, for producers. In the case of programs to reduce emissions of global greenhouse gases, for instance, most of the benefits appear to be in agriculture, a productive sector. Public programs in general provide a combination of public and private benefits: the share of commercial vehicles on roads is typically high in poor countries. In related papers, "Externalities and Production Efficiency" (Policy Research Working Paper 2319) and "Environmental Protection and Optimal Taxation" (Policy Research Working Paper 2510), the author shows that under optimal taxation, marginal abatement costs should be the same for polluting government, polluting producers, and polluting consumers, rich and poor.
dc.formatapplication/pdf
dc.formattext/plain
dc.identifierhttp://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2000/12/748709/public-expenditures-environmental-protection-cost-funds-irrelevant
dc.identifierhttps://hdl.handle.net/10986/19734
dc.identifierhttps://doi.org/10.1596/1813-9450-2507
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/123456789/418853
dc.languageEnglish
dc.languageen_US
dc.publisherWorld Bank, Washington, DC
dc.relationPolicy Research Working Paper;No. 2507
dc.rightsCC BY 3.0 IGO
dc.rightshttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/
dc.subjectAGGREGATE LEVEL
dc.subjectAGGREGATE PRODUCTION
dc.subjectAGRICULTURE
dc.subjectBENEFIT COST ANALYSIS
dc.subjectCOMMODITY TAXES
dc.subjectCONSTANT RETURNS TO SCALE
dc.subjectCONSUMER PREFERENCES
dc.subjectCONSUMERS
dc.subjectCOST BENEFIT ANALYSIS
dc.subjectCOST SAVINGS
dc.subjectDIRECT VALUE
dc.subjectELASTICITIES
dc.subjectELASTICITY
dc.subjectEMISSION
dc.subjectEMISSION COEFFICIENTS
dc.subjectEMISSION FACTOR
dc.subjectEMISSION FACTORS
dc.subjectEMISSION REDUCTIONS
dc.subjectEMISSION STANDARDS
dc.subjectEMISSION TAX
dc.subjectEMISSION TAXES
dc.subjectEMISSIONS
dc.subjectENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
dc.subjectENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY
dc.subjectEXTERNALITIES
dc.subjectEXTERNALITY
dc.subjectFUELS
dc.subjectGOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES
dc.subjectGREENHOUSE GAS
dc.subjectGREENHOUSE GASES
dc.subjectINCOME
dc.subjectINCOME EFFECT
dc.subjectINFERIOR GOODS
dc.subjectMARGINAL ABATEMENT
dc.subjectMARGINAL ABATEMENT COSTS
dc.subjectMARGINAL BENEFITS
dc.subjectMARGINAL COST
dc.subjectMARGINAL COSTS
dc.subjectMARGINAL EMISSION REDUCTIONS
dc.subjectMARGINAL UTILITY
dc.subjectMARGINAL VALUE
dc.subjectNEGATIVE EXTERNALITIES
dc.subjectPOLLUTED WATER
dc.subjectPOLLUTERS
dc.subjectPOLLUTION
dc.subjectPOLLUTION ABATEMENT
dc.subjectPOLLUTION CONTROL
dc.subjectPRIVATE GOODS
dc.subjectPRIVATE SECTOR
dc.subjectPRODUCERS
dc.subjectPRODUCTION EFFICIENCY
dc.subjectPRODUCTIVITY
dc.subjectPUBLIC ECONOMICS
dc.subjectPUBLIC EXPENDITURES
dc.subjectPUBLIC FINANCE
dc.subjectPUBLIC FUNDS
dc.subjectPUBLIC GOOD
dc.subjectPUBLIC GOODS
dc.subjectROADS
dc.subjectSHADOW PRICE
dc.subjectSMOKE
dc.subjectTAX RATES
dc.subjectTAXATION
dc.subjectTOTAL OUTPUT
dc.subjectTREASURY
dc.subjectUNDERLYING PROBLEM
dc.subjectUTILITY FUNCTION
dc.subjectVALUATION
dc.subjectWELFARE FUNCTION
dc.subjectWILLINGNESS TO PAY
dc.titlePublic Expenditures and Environmental Protection : When Is the Cost of Funds Irrelevant?

Archivos

Colecciones

AgroKnow