The Structure of Lobbying and Protection in U.S. Agriculture

Vista sencilla de ítem
dc.creatorGawande, Kishore
dc.date2012-06-18T15:32:15Z
dc.date2012-06-18T15:32:15Z
dc.date2005-09
dc.date.accessioned2026-07-01T00:34:49Z
dc.descriptionThe author surveys the empirical literature on the political economy of agricultural protection. He uses a detailed data set of agricultural Political Action Committee (PAC) contributions over five U.S. congressional election cycles over the 1991-2000 period to investigate the relationship between lobbying spending and agricultural protection. A detailed graphical analysis of campaign contributions by the agricultural PACs indicates that although there are very many PACs, in most sectors the majority of contributions are made by very few PACs. Econometric analysis reveals that lobbying spending by agricultural PACs is positively associated with the use of nontariff barriers and specific tariffs by the United States. There is a strong association between the average U.S. tariff on goods that benefit from U.S. export subsidies and lobbying spending. And there is no association between agricultural protection and trade measures such as import penetration and the export-to-output ratio.
dc.formatapplication/pdf
dc.formattext/plain
dc.identifierhttp://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2005/09/6294485/structure-lobbying-protection-agriculture
dc.identifierhttps://hdl.handle.net/10986/8262
dc.identifierhttps://doi.org/10.1596/1813-9450-3722
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/123456789/406576
dc.languageEnglish
dc.publisherWorld Bank, Washington, DC
dc.relationPolicy Research Working Paper; No. 3722
dc.rightsCC BY 3.0 IGO
dc.rightshttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/
dc.rightsWorld Bank
dc.subjectAGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS
dc.subjectAGRICULTURAL OUTPUT
dc.subjectAGRICULTURAL POLICY
dc.subjectAGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS
dc.subjectAGRICULTURE
dc.subjectARISTOCRACY
dc.subjectBROOKS
dc.subjectCAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS
dc.subjectCOLLECTIVE ACTION
dc.subjectCOMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE
dc.subjectCOMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE
dc.subjectCONSTITUENCY
dc.subjectCONSTITUENTS
dc.subjectCONSUMER SURPLUS
dc.subjectCONSUMERS
dc.subjectDECISION MAKERS
dc.subjectDEMAND CURVE
dc.subjectECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS
dc.subjectECONOMETRIC MODELS
dc.subjectECONOMIC EQUILIBRIUM
dc.subjectECONOMICS LITERATURE
dc.subjectELASTICITY
dc.subjectEQUIPMENT
dc.subjectEUROPEAN UNION
dc.subjectFARMERS
dc.subjectFARMS
dc.subjectFORESTRY
dc.subjectFREE RIDER
dc.subjectFREE RIDER PROBLEM
dc.subjectFREE TRADE
dc.subjectFRUITS
dc.subjectGDP
dc.subjectINCOMES
dc.subjectINDUSTRIAL ECONOMIES
dc.subjectINTEREST GROUPS
dc.subjectLAND OWNERSHIP
dc.subjectLOBBYING
dc.subjectMAJORITIES
dc.subjectNASH EQUILIBRIUM
dc.subjectPAC
dc.subjectPOLITICAL ACTION COMMITTEES
dc.subjectPOLITICAL ECONOMY
dc.subjectPOLITICAL ENVIRONMENT
dc.subjectPOLITICAL SUPPORT
dc.subjectPOLITICIANS
dc.subjectPRESSURE GROUPS
dc.subjectPROGRAMS
dc.subjectSOFT MONEY
dc.subjectSUPPLY CURVE
dc.subjectSUPPLY CURVES
dc.subjectTOTAL OUTPUT
dc.subjectTRADE BARRIERS
dc.subjectTRADE LIBERALIZATION
dc.subjectURUGUAY ROUND
dc.subjectUTILITY FUNCTIONS
dc.subjectVALUE ADDED
dc.subjectVOTING
dc.subjectWAGE RATES
dc.subjectWAGES
dc.titleThe Structure of Lobbying and Protection in U.S. Agriculture

Archivos

Colecciones

AgroKnow