Should Aid Reward Performance? Evidence from a Field Experiment on Health and Education in Indonesia

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dc.creatorOlken, Benjamin A.
dc.creatorOnishi, Junko
dc.creatorWong, Susan
dc.date2014-11-13T20:41:44Z
dc.date2014-11-13T20:41:44Z
dc.date2014-10
dc.date.accessioned2026-07-01T00:55:33Z
dc.descriptionWe report an experiment in 3,000 villages that tested whether incentives improve aid efficacy. Villages received block grants for maternal and child health and education that incorporated relative performance incentives. Subdistricts were randomized into incentives, an otherwise identical program without incentives, or control. Incentives initially improved preventative health indicators, particularly in underdeveloped areas, and spending efficiency increased. While school enrollments improved overall, incentives had no differential impact on education, and incentive health effects diminished over time. Reductions in neonatal mortality in non-incentivized areas did not persist with incentives. We find no systematic scoring manipulation nor funding reallocation toward richer areas.
dc.formatapplication/pdf
dc.identifierAmerican Economic Journal: Applied Economics
dc.identifierhttps://hdl.handle.net/10986/20533
dc.identifierhttps://doi.org/10.1596/20533
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/123456789/413038
dc.languageen_US
dc.publisherAmerican Economic Association
dc.rightsCC BY 3.0 IGO
dc.rightshttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo
dc.rightsAmerican Economic Association
dc.subjectforeign aid
dc.subjecthealth policy
dc.subjecteducation policy
dc.subjectmaternal health
dc.subjectgender
dc.subjectdiscrimination
dc.titleShould Aid Reward Performance? Evidence from a Field Experiment on Health and Education in Indonesia
dc.typeJournal Article
dc.typeArticle de journal
dc.typeArtículo de revista

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