Optimal Institutional Mechanisms for Funding Generic Advertising: An Experimental Analysis

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dc.creatorMesser, Kent D.
dc.creatorSchmit, Todd M.
dc.creatorKaiser, Harry M.
dc.date2017-04-01T16:42:48Z
dc.date.accessioned2026-07-09T05:59:49Z
dc.descriptionGiven the uncertain legal status of generic advertising programs for agricultural commodities, alternative voluntary funding institutions are investigated hat could provide a high level of benefits to producers. This experimental study simulates key economic and psychological factors that affect producer contributions to generic advertising. The results suggests that producer referendum play a critical role in increasing contributions and that producer surplus is maximized by a Provision Point Mechanism instituted by producer referendum with thresholds ranging from 68% to 90%, and expected funding from 47% to 77% of the time, depending on the level of advertising effectiveness.
dc.identifierdoi:10.22004/ag.econ.122106
dc.identifierhttps://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/122106/files/Cornell_Dyson_rb0412.pdf
dc.identifierhttp://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/122106
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/123456789/571021
dc.languageeng
dc.publisher
dc.sourcehttp://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/122106
dc.titleOptimal Institutional Mechanisms for Funding Generic Advertising: An Experimental Analysis
dc.typeText

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