Do Intensity Targets Control Uncertainty Better than Quotas? Conditions, Calibrations, and Caveats

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dc.creatorMarschinski, Robert
dc.creatorLecocq, Franck
dc.date2012-06-26T14:27:38Z
dc.date2012-06-26T14:27:38Z
dc.date2006-10
dc.date.accessioned2026-07-01T01:29:23Z
dc.descriptionAmong policy instruments to control future greenhouse gas emissions, well-calibrated general intensity targets are known to lead to lower uncertainty on the amount of abatement than emissions quotas (Jotzo and Pezzey 2004). The authors test whether this result holds in a broader framework, and whether it applies to other policy-relevant variables as well. To do so, they provide a general representation of the uncertainty on future GDP, future business-as-usual emissions, and future abatement costs. The authors derive the variances of four variables, namely (effective) emissions, abatement effort, marginal abatement costs, and total abatement costs over GDP under a quota, a linear (LIT) and a general intensity target (GIT)-where the emissions ceiling is a power-law function of GDP. They confirm that GITs can yield a lower variance than a quota for marginal costs, but find that this is not true for total costs over GDP. Using economic and emissions scenarios and forecast errors of past projections, the authors estimate ranges of values for key parameters in their model. They find that quotas dominate LITs over most of this range, that calibrating GITs over this wide range is difficult, and that GITs would yield only modest reductions in uncertainty relative to quotas.
dc.formatapplication/pdf
dc.formattext/plain
dc.identifierhttp://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2006/10/7125500/intensity-targets-control-uncertainty-better-quotas-conditions-calibrations-caveats
dc.identifierhttps://hdl.handle.net/10986/9016
dc.identifierhttps://doi.org/10.1596/1813-9450-4033
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/123456789/418546
dc.languageEnglish
dc.languageen_US
dc.publisherWorld Bank, Washington, DC
dc.relationPolicy Research Working Paper; No. 4033
dc.rightsCC BY 3.0 IGO
dc.rightshttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/
dc.rightsWorld Bank
dc.subjectABATEMENT
dc.subjectABATEMENT COST
dc.subjectABATEMENT COSTS
dc.subjectABATEMENT LEVEL
dc.subjectBASELINE EMISSIONS
dc.subjectBENCHMARK
dc.subjectCARBON
dc.subjectCLIMATE
dc.subjectCLIMATE CHANGE
dc.subjectCLIMATE POLICIES
dc.subjectCLIMATE POLICY
dc.subjectCO2
dc.subjectCO2 EMISSIONS
dc.subjectCOST FUNCTIONS
dc.subjectCUMULATIVE EMISSIONS
dc.subjectDEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS
dc.subjectECONOMIC INSTRUMENTS
dc.subjectECONOMICS RESEARCH
dc.subjectEFFECTIVE EMISSIONS
dc.subjectELASTICITY
dc.subjectEMISSION
dc.subjectEMISSION REDUCTIONS
dc.subjectEMISSIONS
dc.subjectEMISSIONS REDUCTION
dc.subjectEMISSIONS RELATIVE
dc.subjectEXPECTED VALUE
dc.subjectFORECASTS
dc.subjectFORESTRY
dc.subjectFUEL
dc.subjectFUEL COMBUSTION
dc.subjectFUNCTIONAL FORMS
dc.subjectGDP
dc.subjectGREENHOUSE
dc.subjectGREENHOUSE GAS
dc.subjectGREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS
dc.subjectGREENHOUSE GASES
dc.subjectGREENHOUSE GASES EMISSIONS
dc.subjectINDEXATION
dc.subjectINTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE
dc.subjectIPCC
dc.subjectKYOTO PROTOCOL
dc.subjectLEVEL OF EMISSIONS
dc.subjectLOWER EMISSIONS
dc.titleDo Intensity Targets Control Uncertainty Better than Quotas? Conditions, Calibrations, and Caveats

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