Can a simple model predict complex bidding behaviour? Repeated multi-unit conservation auctions.
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Buying environmental services from private landholders using auction mechanisms
often involves repeated multi-unit procurement-type auctions. These can either be
target-constrained or budget-constrained. Most of the theoretical literature has
focused on the former, whereas government agencies have, for conservation
purposes, mainly implemented the latter. This paper examines the predictive power of
a simple model previously developed for budget-constrained auctions, in comparison
to that of the more standard and more complex target-constrained auction model.
Experiments carried out in Germany and Australia lend credibility to the nonstandard
and simpler budget-constrained model.